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This thesis is a case study of South Korea’s contemporary political economic history 
through the lens of the balance between the state and big business. It examines the 
evolving relationship between the state and the chaebols, or domestic conglomerates, 
which is at the heart of the Korean trajectory of postwar industrialization and growth. The 
thesis proposes that the political transitions over the past 50 years, both authoritarian and 
democratic, were central markers for the shifting balance between the state and the 
chaebols. The 3rd and 4th Republics under Park Chung-hee marked the initiation of the 
state-chaebol partnership: monopolization of the market began during Chun Doo-hwan’s 
authoritarian transition; and the inauguration of South Korea’s liberal democracy allowed 
the chaebols to establish themselves as a durable national institution both prior to and 
after the 1997 IMF crisis. Thus, over time, the state-business balance tilted in favor of the 
chaebols and the formation of this business oligarchy created detrimental market 
conditions that corroded political, economic, and social institutions. The conclusion 
provides a summary of South Korea’s unique market institutional impacts and the lessons 
learned from the research.   
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I. SOUTH KOREA’S DEVELOPMENTAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The appropriate balance between state and market in the pursuit of growth and 
industrialization persists as a crucial question in the study of political economy. In order 
to better understand the balance between the state and private sector, the following 
presents a historical examination of South Korea’s growth experience. With an 
unprecedented rate of development, South Korea has been hailed as an Asian Tiger that 
achieved extremely high economic growth and industrialization during the post-World 
War II period. In fact, many have called Korea’s case study an Asian “economic miracle” 
after it transitioned from a third world to a modernized country in a span of decades. As 
of 2011, according to World Bank statistics, Korea is listed as a high income member 
country of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with 
a gross domestic product (GDP) of over $1.116 trillion.1 Meanwhile, neither 
democratization nor the inception of a free market economic system prevented political 
turmoil and economic crises. The historical vantage of South Korean industrialization 
allows a specific evaluation of the benefits and consequences of developmental capitalist 
growth initiated under mercantilism.  The evolution of the private sector was at the center 
of South Korea’s progress as the chaebols were at the core of country’s nine percent 
average rate of growth from 1960 to mid-1990s.2 Therefore, this thesis focuses on the 
role of the chaebols, the family run business conglomerates, during the course of South 
Korean industrialization as a lens through which to explore the task of describing and 
prescribing the balance between government intervention and a free market economy.3 
With an emphasis on the centrality of national security, the politics and economics of 
South Korea have been wedded to each other throughout the country’s post-Korean War 
reconstruction. Most advanced industrialized economies saw capitalism and democracy 
                                                 
1 World Bank, “Korea, Rep.,” 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/country/korea-republic. 
2 Peter M. Beck, “Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol,” Asian Survey 38, no. 11 (1998): 1018.  
3 Yeonho Lee, “Participatory Democracy and Chaebol Regulation in Korea: State-Market Relations 
under the MDP Governments, 1997–2003,” Asian Survey 45, no. 2 (2005): 293. 
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advance hand in hand.4 In South Korea, by contrast, the state did not necessarily follow a 
particular developmental model as long as its results were justified; thus the country’s 
progress in achieving capitalization and democratization was separate and sporadic. 
Furthermore, in Korea’s case, a rapid burst of economic growth came under an 
authoritarian system of politics. Similar to other Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Japan, South Korea did not necessarily undergo periods of development 
that incorporated liberal democracy and a capitalist market system together. While the 
short term national goals of increasing capital were attained under the mercantilist 
strategy, the long-term political and economic foci of promoting a sustainable and 
balanced free market economy along with democratic institutions promoting rule of law 
were overshadowed by the formation of business oligarchies. 
With the advent of industrialization, which rapidly transitioned agrarian societies 
to modern economies, the process of accumulating capital became a priority for a 
country’s prospect for growth. As the pace of economic growth accelerated, so did 
institutional changes. Establishing a free market economy was necessary to increase 
wealth and compete internationally. Capitalism has proven to benefit society as a whole 
and is now a necessary mechanism for wealth.5 The inception of this modern 
phenomenon has not only accelerated the pace of unprecedented growth rates but also 
allowed “long term effect of compound growth rates.”6 All the meanwhile, economic 
expansion that changed national conditions required appropriate political institutional 
adjustment. In Korea’s case, the relative influence of the private sector versus the 
government became one-sided. This thesis will advance the argument that as the 
businesses overpowered the government, it deprived Korea of stable transitions moving 
forward by preventing key market institutions from developing.   
The conventional understanding of “Korea, Inc.” that emphasizes state-led growth 
is inadequate. The contours of Korea’s government-led business culture must be further 
                                                 
4 Milton Friedman, “Capitalism and Freedom,” in The Political Economy Reader: Markets as 
Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 107. 
5 Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and 
Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 8–9.  
6 Ibid., 11.   
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expanded since the conglomerates have, in the course of time, played a dominant role 
throughout South Korea’s modernization. For the sake of describing South Korea’s 
economy, the “market” can be viewed as an amalgamation of institutions, synthetic 
practices or establishments. The institution of the “chaebol,” or family run business 
conglomerates, was central in the Korean industrialization experience, an insight often 
captured in the phrase “Korea, Inc.” In the highly top-down Korean governance structure, 
among the bargains that underpinned the legitimacy of political regimes, the state-
business relationship was a major driver of economic development. A historical 
perspective on the chaebol reveals that the immediate and long-term outcomes of this 
political economic innovation helped Korea achieve unprecedented national growth. Yet, 
the chaebol institution also evolved into an unregulated organization as the government 
lost the capacity to regulate the private sector. Maintaining a sustainable business-
government relationship requires identifying incessant change requires appropriate 
economic and political reciprocation. Bereft of continuously reciprocated adaptation of 
the private sector with necessary checks and balances, the state inevitably lost its mantle 
of control.  
The significance of the term “Korean, Inc.” changes by the end of the twentieth 
century as it is evident that the balance of control shifted away from government toward 
the business sector. Path dependencies, nationalism, and leadership guidance during each 
political phase of the Korean Republic have all directly contributed to the establishment 
and furtherance of the chaebol system. This thesis will demonstrated that the close state-
business partnership that began mutually with both the government and the chaebols 
dependent on one another changed significantly throughout authoritarian transitions and 
during democratic nascence. As the chaebols became the uncontested proprietors of 
national wealth in a market that lacked comprehensive rule of law institutions, South 
Korea more generally failed to transition from mercantilist policies towards a liberal 
market economy. Furthermore, although institutions and political bargains may have been 
critical to Korea’s growth strategy, without embedded checks and balances that allowed 
transparency and accountability, those benign relationships and institutions were 
susceptible to corruption and crises despite successful economic performance. The 
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following will reveal that as the business sector received continual support from the 
government without institutional rule of law, both the autonomy and the capacity of the 
private sector expanded to the point that the state was eventually forced to maintain its 
sponsorship of big business during and after national crises. 
Simply focusing on the results and neglecting the processes proved disastrous for 
South Korea. The government failed to properly identify the risks regarding the 
incessantly changing nature of the chaebols and the impact this evolution had on the 
broader political economy. Without proper diagnosis of the problems, control measures 
to mitigate market failures were absent. The neoclassical lens pinpoints the dangers of 
mercantilism in South Korea to be the hazards associated with the chaebols or 
monopolies. Their government safety nets contributed to the country’s 1997 IMF crisis 
and the long term symptom of a distorted market as the dominance of the chaebols 
prevented the entrepreneurial spirit. In turn, the resulting lack of small and medium 
enterprises remains a conundrum for the state today.  Hence the term “Korea, Inc.” has 
been used to capture the developmental state orientation of the South Korean political 
economy but it obscures the extent to which the state and business had competing 
interests and how the relative power balance between the two shifted over time.  
Two schools of economic theories will be considered to evaluate South Korea’s 
development in both descriptive and prescriptive senses: the liberal and institutional. 
From one point of view, liberal economic theorists argue that the role of the government 
must be minimal in order to achieve market efficiency. In response, proponents of market 
institutionalism debunk the ideal economic prescription by providing various lenses.  For 
the sake of holistically explaining South Korea’s political economic balance, 
mercantilism along with economic sociology and history will be utilized, such that 
market systems are viewed as a set of complex interdependencies among economic, 
political, and social institutions that vary in scope “across time, space, and fields.”7 Key 
political transitions that have impacted the economic institutions and environment will be 
identified and examined to understand why, when, how, and to what extent the chaebols 
                                                 
7 Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel, eds., The Political Economy Reader: Markets as 
Institutions (New York: Routledge, 2008), 2. 
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took control of the national economy from the state, thereby redefining the term Korea, 
Inc. The historical study of the chaebols’ collective evolution of autonomy and capacity 
throughout South Korea’s modernization period is critical to understanding the dynamics 
of the country’s political economic balance. 
B. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary lens through which this thesis will analyze South Korea’s political 
economy is by identifying the interplay between the state, the chaebols, and the market. 
The causal logic will utilize independent, intervening, and dependent variables to 
systematically examine two hypotheses. The independent variables (IVs) of the thesis 
will be the type of political regime in place (on a scale of fully authoritarian to fully 
democratic) and the vulnerabilities associated with regime transitions in South Korea 
(hereafter referred to as transitional vulnerabilities, critical political junctures that 
provide opportune timing for shifts within the state-business balance). The intervening 
variable of this research will be the relative balance between the state and chaebols. The 
research will apply concepts of “autonomy” and “capacity,” traditional political concepts 
outlined by Max Weber to describe states, to better understand and provide a measure for 
the relative organizational power of the chaebols vis-à-vis the state. In other words, the 
more autonomous and highly capacitated the chaebols, the more the balance of power 
shifted to these conglomerates. The dependent variables (DVs) include economic growth; 
the level of corruption and inequality; and the degree of market distortion and 
monopolization.  
The first hypothesis (relating the independent and intervening variables) proposes 
that the transitions throughout the authoritarian and democratic regime changes were the 
central reasons for the shift in balance between the state and chaebols. Each political 
period’s macroeconomic agenda will be evaluated on the basis of identifying institutions 
and prescribed policies that shifted the political economic balance. The second hypothesis 
(relating the intervening and dependent variables) suggests that as the state-business 
balance tilted in favor of the chaebols, the formation of the business oligarchy created 
detrimental market conditions that corroded political, economic, and social institutions.  
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Statistical data will be utilized to demonstrate national growth trends to explain 
South Korea’s overall growth. In addition, the thesis will deliver a qualitative analysis, 
resting on published scholarly works and newspaper articles, which better establishes the 
priorities and interests of the Korean state and businesses over time.  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This first chapter has provided an overview of South Korea’s economic standing 
and the nature of the chaebols, and outlined the research question and methods shaping 
the thesis. The second chapter will outline the competing economic explanations for 
South Korean success, liberalism and the institutionalist perspectives including path 
dependent factors. The following empirical chapters will focus on analyzing the changing 
balance between the state and the chaebols, along with the effects of this relative balance 
on key economic outcomes such as growth, corruption, and market distortions. Each 
chapter will cover one main political period: the first being the military authoritarianism 
of Park Chung-hee during the 3rd and 4th Republics; the second being the pre-1997 IMF 
crisis era including the Fifth Republic led by authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan and the 
democratic transition towards the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo; and the last being 
the 1997 IMF crisis under Kim Dae Jung and post crisis reform under Kim Dae Jung. The 
final chapter will summarize the findings to include lessons learned from the research in 
order to evaluate the hypotheses and provide a future outlook for South Korea’s political 
economy.  
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II. COMPETING ECONOMIC THEORIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents competing views on the relationship between states and 
markets in the pursuit of growth and industrialization. The core debate between economic 
liberalism and mercantilism provides a theoretical framework for understanding the 
state’s rationale behind the economic policies that established the roles of the chaebol 
within the various political eras, as well as a lens for understanding their volatile 
relationship with the government throughout Korea’s industrialization experience. The 
rudimentary theoretical framework grounding this research originates with the debate 
between Adam Smith’s liberal economic theory and Friedrich List’s mercantilist 
argument for the necessities of government intervention. Highlighting the pertinent 
theories also provides the lens to comprehensively describe the state’s prescriptions and 
the ensuing economic environment in which the chaebols thrived. The debate will start 
with the theoretical origins of a capitalist market system and further broaden the scope of 
analysis with modern institutional concepts. The applicability of each theory is assessed 
against the South Korean context, thereby providing an evaluation of the advantages and 
weaknesses of the prescription based on timing, conditions, and interests.   
B. ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 
Economic liberalism serves as the paradigm for an ideal market economy. 
Classical liberalism originates with Adam Smith’s economic theory in 1776, developed 
during the English industrial revolution, which suggests a laissez faire government role 
will free a utilitarian market to naturally develop and sustain optimal price mechanisms 
through the ‘invisible hand’ of the self-correcting market.8 The notion of an efficient free 
market is predicated upon the “division of labor,” which allows specialization of the 
workforce, improved economy of time, utilization of machinery to increase production, 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 21–22. 
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and human nature’s “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange.”9 Parallel to the micro-
economic logic that the free market is the most efficient allocation mechanism and 
creates economic surplus as a result, the macro-economic view of economic liberals is 
that free trade among countries on the basis of comparative advantage maximizes 
economic gain and increases national wealth.  
Because market liberals focus on near perfect economic conditions assuming an 
even playing field for rational players, the state, as Smith prescribed, is to be limited to 
providing three attributes not provided by the market in order to protect the system from 
within and outside: security services, the rule of law structure, and public goods.10 Any 
further government intervention in the market is believed to impede upon the natural 
efficiency of the invisible hand and discourage competition. Modern neoliberal 
economist Friedrich Hayek supports Smith’s arguments asserting that all types of 
“collectivism”—including broad government intervention in the economic—are 
inherently inferior to the spontaneous competition that efficiently coordinates the market 
economy.11 Hayek further contends that “mixing competition and planning” would be 
inherently incompatible and that the role of the state should be limited to providing the 
framework of the “great liberal principle,” which is a rule of law that provides 
predictability and an anti-discriminatory environment to prevent the government from 
imposing unnecessary power upon individual freedom and interests.12  
According to Milton Friedman, intervention itself is of an equal or greater 
problem in comparison to the “market failure,” which the state attempts to correct with 
subsequent price distortions along with resulting inefficiencies illustrated by the market’s 
deadweight loss.13 Friedman also claims that the freedom allowed in the economy is 
                                                 
9 Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” in The Political 
Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 29, 32.  
10 Barma and Vogel, The Political Economy Reader, 22. 
11 Barma and Vogel, The Political Economy Reader, 88; Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Road to Serfdom,” 
in The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 92–93. 
12 Barma and Vogel, The Political Economy Reader, 88; Hayek, “The Road to Serfdom,” 97. 
13 Barma and Vogel, The Political Economy Reader, 88. 
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critical to upholding political liberties since the government’s primary purpose is to serve 
the people.14 The market liberals would emphasize that South Korea pursued a free 
trading, export-oriented industrialization strategy that enabled it to benefit on the basis of 
its comparative advantage on international markets. In this view, the chaebols are 
actually inefficient and distortionary, and South Korea succeeded despite them, not 
because of them.  
To the liberal economists, any prescription that departed from a free market was 
inefficient. Soon after the “East Asian miracle,” studies attempted to explain how the 
Asian Tigers including South Korea were able to expedite growth. The World Bank 
developed a framework, based on Smith’s neoclassical economic prescriptions, of the 
specific policies and conditions necessary for a successful market economy. This 
neoclassical perspective—while acknowledging that each high performing Asian 
economy’s (HPAE) model is unique—identified a shared set of fundamentals that were 
needed for growth. These included, bolstering national human capital with education, 
establishing an environment conducive for savings and investments, limiting inflation, 
allowing competitive exchange rates, and—most importantly in contrast to the 
interventionist perspective—limiting price distortion. 15 Within the liberal economic 
mindset, South Korea’s industrial policies focusing on specific sectors such as heavy and 
chemical industries were ineffective since the targeted industries’ growth trajectories 
were simply market conforming. In other words, policies based on coordination between 
state and the private sectors did not achieve levels of productivity higher to their 
competitors at the time.16 
Yet what is missing from the liberal economic logic is that the execution of each 
economic prescription requires the planning and coordination of non-market institutions. 
While liberal theories describe optimistic market conditions, countries must have the 
                                                 
14 Barma and Vogel, The Political Economy Reader, 88; Milton Friedman, “Capitalism and Freedom,” 
in The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 108–109. 
15 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 347–352.  
16 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, 354–355. 
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availability of time, resources, and conditions needed to function in accordance with the 
free market criterion. And although the end goal has been to pursue a self-sustaining 
liberal market, this cannot be achieved without the proper conditions that need to be 
addressed by non-economic institutions as well. In South Korea’s case, the environment, 
which lacked an educated work force, economic policies, and industrial infrastructure 
was not conducive for the immediate implementation of a free market economy. 
Therefore, creating and transitioning to a free market economy both precipitated the 
establishment and the correction of the chaebols required varying degrees of government 
intervention and oversight. Explaining South Korea’s experience merely with economic 
liberalism limits the analysis to be primarily economic and restricts the explanation of 
additional critical political and societal institutions that interact with the economy.  
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Institutionalism debunks the neoclassical outlook by providing detailed insight 
into how and why institutions, formal and informal practices and establishments, came 
about—encompassing both external and internal social, political, and economic 
circumstances. Given the changing nature of the myriad of institutions at the 
international, national, and societal levels, economic policies did not remain constant and 
are unique based on timing, conditions, and interests. The institutionalist perspective is 
best utilized to describe what had happened in the past in order to prescribe the processes 
and lessons for sustainable growth. While the market-liberal perspective highlights 
reliance on primarily free market institutions, the market-institutional school integrates a 
range of economic, political, and social institutions to provide a broader scope of 
analysis. The rationality behind employing practical institutions to analyze markets is to 
assess both efficiency and effectiveness of individual economies avoiding 
generalizations.  
Recognizing the interactions of the myriad of institutions, both synthetic and path 
dependent formal and informal practices, discloses industrialization as an ongoing 
process of development. South Korea’s initial macroeconomic industrial strategy focused 
on state generated comprehensive internal processes and inputs that aimed to cultivate 
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economic capacity by way of transitioning from import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
to export oriented industrialization (EOI). Accepting the concept that capitalist 
institutions are constructed,17 the research intends to elaborate on the durability of a 
unique national political economic institution—the chaebols—that have not only endured 
various presidential terms but have grown to a point where policy makers could no longer 
regulate them. This comprehensive analysis of the chaebols’ rise contributes to the 
broader scholarly debate on whether South Korea’s mercantilist policies were necessary 
for national growth and worth the risks of stalling democratic institutions in South Korea 
throughout its post Korean War reconstruction era.  
The institutional school encompasses mercantilism, economic socialism, and 
economic history to be various lenses to view economic progression, as follows. 
1. Mercantilism 
In an era of competitive nation states facing limited time and resources, political 
institutions play an integral role in developing and protecting the national markets. 
Friedrich List of the mercantilist school focuses on the role of the government within the 
state-market balance since national interests are not necessarily attained through 
individual self-interests.18 While a market liberal economy may be ideal, depending on 
the particular circumstances of a country—including those, for example, that face an 
existential threat such as the North Korean regime—governments may not have the 
luxury of time to wait for the economic system to organically mature the forces of 
production, or countries are not capable of self-sufficiency due to a lack of resources. 
Among the institutions developing the powers of production is the state, which has in 
mind not only the capability to produce goods but also to gain industrial independence, 
which leads to bolstering national security. The mercantilist logic critiques the liberal 
perspective, emphasizing that the “power of producing wealth” is more important than  
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“wealth itself.”19 Particularly in a top down society such as South Korea, the state 
leadership’s role directly contributed to the acceleration of the country’s industrial 
capacity.  
Mercantilists recognize that markets are not all created under similar conditions 
and that the government has the responsibility to protect society from the dangers of a 
distorted market. Therefore, to foster a well-rounded growth trajectory, List notes that the 
state must oversee the “balance or the harmony of the productive powers” so that society 
does not become solely fixated on a single sector of production and to prevent becoming 
dependent on a foreign country for goods.20 When the market lacks direction, the state 
also sets the goals to engineer the productive powers. At times, this would mean directing 
capital and enabling certain social groups to perform at higher levels. Additionally, it is 
the responsibility of the government to intervene in response to harmful economic 
conditions, which potentially threatens national security, created by greed of the private 
sector and foreign industries that aim to exploit and monopolize the domestic economy.21 
The mercantilist school reasons that it is unlikely for responsible governments to 
intentionally intervene in the market economy to create inefficiencies; on the contrary, 
the intent behind the economic policies is to ensure effectiveness.  
Mercantilism was the main prescription that allowed South Korea to achieve its 
economic miracle within a given time frame; however, the fast paced growth was not 
sustainable. Even with the integrated strategy that focused the partnership between the 
state and the economy, South Korea continued to struggle with its transition towards a 
liberal market economy due to socio-political institutions that made rule of law futile.   
2. Economic Sociology 
South Korea’s economic phenomenon cannot be attributed to one factor alone. 
Interventionist approaches also known as mercantilism or Keynesian economics, 
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highlight the role of the state and the neoclassical arguments tend to emphasize free 
markets to explain aggregate growth. The sociological institutionalists’ focus on the 
relative balance in the interactions between the state and the business sector. Economic 
sociologists broaden the overall viewpoint on political economy by asserting that markets 
are not limited to the scope of economics but operate within society and the two have 
been inherently interconnected from the beginning. Therefore, viewing the market as an 
institution, it is an extension of society.  
Emphasizing the important role of social agents such as the state, Karl Polanyi 
points out that markets and regulations also develop together creating a “double 
movement” in which the free market forces and protectionist measures interact as the 
market progresses.22 Overemphasizing the economic impacts of the market, Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of the Nations was obsolete by the twentieth century and did not foresee 
the pervasive consequences of modern technology. While the industrial revolution 
increases the wealth of countries, the so called self-regulating market was unable to 
prevent the ‘satanic mills’ or the factories from exploiting the masses and widening the 
gap between the rich and the poor creating uneven social conditions.23 Furthermore, top 
down and bottom up interactions are required for sustainable growth. Explaining that the 
market is not limited to only economic motives, Polanyi illustrates that social principles 
of “reciprocity” and “redistribution” ensures the order of production.24 In addition, 
existing patterns of “symmetry” and “centricity” further provides insight to how people 
have engaged in trade and supply operations prior to a formal market system.25  
South Korea failed to establish proper checks and balances between the 
government and chaebols, which deprived the relationship of balance and made it 
lopsided.  Eventually, the conglomerates grow too big to manage without rule of law, 
demonstrating how capitalism contains within itself the seeds of self-disruption. 
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Nonetheless, through the lens of connectivity, economic sociologists recognize that the 
role of the government can directly impact the market’s rate of change enabling 
adjustments for society.26 Liberal theories make valid arguments for an exclusive 
paradigm but the prescription lacks universal applicability; meanwhile, economic 
sociology serves as a broad and in depth institutional perspective to examine markets. 
Without understanding the social context in which different countries choose and develop 
a variety of economic institutions, we cannot understand the chaebol without 
understanding how they relate to Korean society. 
3. Historical Perspective of Industrialization 
History discloses that each society is different, and as a result, no economic 
systems are alike. Various institutions create unique conditions over time. In response to 
W. W. Rostow’s prematurely outlined five “stages of economic growth” that all countries 
will undergo,27 Alexander Gerschenkron may agree with the generalities of early 
development stating that the ingredients of growth are human capital, physical capital, 
and total factor productivity. However, in regard to latter phases of development, a linear 
growth trajectory is often irrelevant.28 To successfully overcome their challenges, late 
industrializing countries not only have the advantage of utilizing available technology but 
are also able to draw upon lessons from previous industrializers to employ pragmatic 
institutions that fit state objectives. An example of a successful late industrializer that 
show how a unique institution served as a key agent of growth is Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), which spearheaded its growth “miracle” with 
both industrial “rationalization” and “structure” policies that applied both macro and 
micro level strategies to create conducive growth conditions in order to optimize business 
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operations.29 What economic history teaches is there are multiple pathways to 
development as “the magnitude of the challenge changes the quality of the response.”30  
South Korea’s pattern of development illustrates the veracity of Gerchenkron’s 
theory on “multiple pathways to development,” which explained that there is no set 
model for development and each country succeeds with “functional substitute” and a 
variety of institutions.31 Similarly, Stephan Haggard argues that as long as the 
endogenous institutions were sound, regime types did not matter for growth.32 Chalmers 
Johnson dismisses a standardized liberal model for the East Asian developmental states 
and explains that with each country’s various priorities and conditions, interventionism 
was necessary and efficient to meet the goals of the leadership in order to prepare for an 
effective market.33 Haggard also explains that institutional shifts accompanied economic 
growth in Asia.34 The chaebols were not only economic institutions but also acted 
collectively as a political institution that deeply impacted society as well. Single party 
authoritarianism meant a lack of political accountability and transparency that further 
facilitated the effective corruption nexus between the politicians and the chaebols. 
Eventually, not only did chaebols’ organizational growth trends resonate with shifts in 
economic policy, the government relied upon them to meet each of its policy objectives 
whether the country was in need of ISI or the transition to EOI.  
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4. Path Dependency 
Social factors and historical events served as powerful impetuses for shaping the 
nascent stages of South Korea’s industrial political economy. The institutionalist 
approach stresses the role of path dependence, highlighting past experiences that shape 
future actions, in developing the raison d’état of the political leadership during South 
Korea’s high growth periods. Also, understanding the path dependent formation of 
market institutions is crucial to understanding how the chaebols came to existence and 
which factors further advanced their national position. Two categories of path dependent 
factors exist—innate factors such as culture and national crises brought by war and 
political instability. These factors have a clear impact on the nature of South Korea’s 
economic policies and results as culture remained as a catalyst for building a competent 
working class and trauma served as a powerful reminder for Koreans to never let a 
foreign power compromise the country’s sovereignty. 
a. Culture—Confucianism  
Confucianism cannot be dismissed as it permeates all levels of society. While 
reform and modernization periods may be explained by the country’s adoption of the 
West’s social, economic, and political institutions, the “traditional cultural [Confucian] 
value system” has and continues to remain in society as the dominating social 
institution.35 Expounding upon this enduring practice in East Asia, Lee Kuan Yew stated 
that “the individual exists in the context of his family,” which also illustrates the stronger 
bond between the paternal system of governance with “default loyalty.”36 The different 
by-products of Confucianism’s role in the state’s relationship with society are evident: 
“communitarian values” created an enduring tightknit national identity that provided 
political legitimacy; disciplined efforts towards education cultivated a capable workforce; 
and “long-term relational contracting” extended partnerships beyond the scope of 
business. This latter point is important in explaining how the political partnership with 
the chaebols was a relatively natural state of affairs, as well as how the promotion of 
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prestige that followed with social status attracted top talent to both the government 
agencies and business conglomerates.37 In these ways, Korea’s primary social culture, 
Confucianism, remained a prevalent cultural factor that vastly improved and accelerated 
the quality of human capital.  
b. Nationalism 
In the nascent years following Korea’s independence, nationalism served as a 
critical factor for mobilizing the country. With a top-down nature that prevailed 
throughout South Korea this nationalism was and still is a cultural trait, serving as a 
moral institution that emphasizes respect and compliance. As a result, this national 
institution greatly empowered and legitimized the executive concentration that in turn 
increased both political and economic autonomy and capacity. Throughout the post war 
periods, innate social compliance under the tenets of Confucianism served as an 
operational catalyst by bolstering the effectiveness of the leadership’s ability to execute 
its policies and agendas without having to invest additional efforts towards garnering 
public support. The cultural environment established optimal conditions for a state-
guided economic strategy that required rapid results.  
c. Colonial Trauma 
Traumatic military and political experiences in the past provide insight to the 
initial rationale in favor of developing robust economic institutions. Its inability to 
modernize at the end of the Chosun dynasty and the ensuing colonial period under the 
Japanese provided South Korea with painful lessons not to be repeated. Korea missed a 
critical opportunity to grow since potential reforms by way of accepting Western 
institutions and technology were condemned by the sadaebu, “social elite and 
bureaucrats…schooled in Confucianism,” who protected the neo-Confucian school of 
thought and rejected alternative teachings that challenged their traditional beliefs.38 The 
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lack of adaptive policies thwarted the country’s potential to import innovative technology 
and left a nation lagging behind in economic trade relations and weapons modernization. 
In the end, the insulated foreign policy based on neo-Confucianism led to the end of the 
Yi dynasty, including the sadaebu, by the advances of the Japanese military.39 The 
subsequent crisis was the period of Japanese colonial rule during which Korea endured 
extreme political and social humiliation. During the occupational period, the already 
homogenous culture became extremely united against their oppressors with intense 
nationalism evident in the unremitting protests and guerrilla tactics up until 
independence.40 As the memories of intrusion remained, not only did South Korea’s 
leadership capitalize on the nationalist sentiment, it also understood that the accumulation 
of physical capital and total factor productivity were indispensable for developing the 
means for military security and readiness.  
d. The Korean War 
The Korean War and its aftermath represented a permanent existential threat to 
South Korea. The ongoing civil war was a result of the unrestrained political freedom in 
Korea immediately following the Japanese occupation. The end of WWII served as a new 
political platform for Korea’s regained sovereignty. Meanwhile, following 36 years of 
Japanese rule, plans for post-war nation building was left unspecified by the international 
community. At the 1943 Cairo Conference, the democratic leaders planning the post-war 
order (including Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill) agreed 
that Korea’s “free and independent” future would be determined “in due course.”41 As 
Korea regained its freedom in February of 1945 at Yalta, Roosevelt and Stalin decided to 
divide the presence of American and Soviet militaries at the 38th parallel.42 The aftermath 
of leaving two divergent political parties with incompatible values led to a state of highly 
armed tensions between the communist and democratic parties of Korea. Even after the 
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Korean War, with the continuing presence of the 38th parallel, the leadership attained a 
legitimate justification to promote the country to grow economically in order to prepare 
for another all-out war. Ultimately, the security dilemma stemming from the Korean War 
served as a powerful validation for political initiatives. 
e. 1st and 2nd Republics (1948–1961) 
Korea’s first two presidents fumbled the opportunity to cement sound political 
and economic institutions. As long as South Korea remained an American proxy state 
against the Communists, post war modernization efforts of the country were entrusted to 
the newly elected “democratic” leader. Limited foreign intervention allowed a greater 
role for the political leadership to shape the future of the country. But Korea’s first 
president, Syngman Rhee, lacked the much needed acumen for economic strategy and 
direction. Following his election in 1948, he procured U.S. support via a U.S.-Korea 
defense treaty strengthening the bilateral relationship, which allowed the country to 
survive the war. Based on his extensive American education, Rhee did form a 
rudimentary democratic political institution—South Korea’s first constitution. However, 
the 1st Republic from 1948 to 1960 left South Korea in infrastructural shambles with 
corrupt rent seeking political culture and incessant social unrest.43 The 2nd Republic, 
which marked President Yun Bo Seon’s nominal tenure from 1960–1962, ended with 
General Park Chung-hee’s military coup d’état and government takeover. With low 
capital, abysmal domestic savings rate, declining foreign aid, weak financial market, and 
public skepticism of industrial service, the end of Rhee’s rule left South Korea in distress 
and in immediate need of its first major progressive economic transition and 
reconstruction.44  
D. CONCLUSION 
A market-institutional lens will be employed in this thesis to demonstrate that the 
family conglomerates, a unique South Korean institution, played a significant role 
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throughout industrialization but also became dangerously autonomous over time. The 
analysis of the state-business relationship reveals the inherent power politics between the 
two actors while economic history demonstrates that the transitions between authoritarian 
leaders were periods of lost opportunity for proper reform giving way to myopic policies. 
With the unqualified and sophomoric democratic experience having failed, the country 
was hungry for economic growth and stability. Until the early 1960s, no one was in 
control nor capable of seizing the commanding heights. Meanwhile, the lessons learned 
from the failed past laid the foundations towards revolutionizing South Korea’s political 
economy. With the increasing salience of economic strategies, the struggle for the 
“commanding heights” or the ‘common ownership of the means of production, 
distribution, and exchange’ has become of national interest.45 Concomitantly, policies 
and procedures that directly impacts markets and societies, require in depth exploration 
of comprehensive institutions throughout time to allow thorough descriptions and 
applicable prescriptions to the economy that will best serve the people, the most essential 
national wealth.  
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III. INCEPTION OF THE CHAEBOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION: HOW THE ECONOMIC ENDS BEGAN TO JUSTIFY 
THE POLITICAL MEANS 
The South Korean market economy at this time was, by force, an extension of 
politics rather than a natural institution of society. With General Park Chung Hee at the 
helm, the country entered its 3rd Republic; and over the next three decades, South Korea’s 
history would be forged by political leaders who rose from military backgrounds. With 
the country transitioning from experiencing periods of ruthless colonial rule and civil 
war, Park was intent on never again allowing such a defeat by another foreign power and 
prioritized a robust industrial economy as the national power base. Additionally, South 
Korea’s military leadership did not deem liberal democratic institutions necessary for 
achieving economic growth. Operating under a constrained timeline, Park aggressively 
employed all necessary means to achieve its objectives in a top down manner.  
Mercantilism was Park’s primary modus operandi to achieve South Korea’s 
industrial takeoff. Friedrich List described this system as a method of governance that 
prioritizes the national interest and focus on the ability to generate capital.46 Lacking the 
luxury of time, resources, or a capable bourgeoisie as the foundation for a market 
economy, interventionism was the viable solution for effective results. List further 
explains that a nation’s ability to produce will not only allow the accumulation of 
physical capital but also provide greater capacity in preparation for crisis such as war.47 
Under the devastated conditions, government interventionism was justified on the basis 
of South Korea’s painful past, marked by failed policies and a direct existential threat. 
Advocates of interventionism argued that a limited window of opportunity warranted 
accelerated growth, which in the case of South Korea may not have been feasible with an 
organically developed free market economy.48 Hence, South Korea’s mercantilist system 
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was initially intended to guide the country towards achieving an advanced market 
economy that would be internationally competitive as quickly as possible.  
The unusual economic success from an authoritarian regime, which took on the 
entrepreneurial role at the macroeconomic level by making the process of business 
coordination with the government more efficient, proved that the institutions, not 
adherence to standardized prescriptions, play a decisive role in determining national 
economic growth.49 Due to demonstrated growth, Park continues to be a contentious 
figure in terms of competing economic explanations. Controlling the commanding 
heights, the government was at the forefront of building a national industrial base. Park 
vested the future of the country to the businesses with his policies and capital allocation 
to the targeted industries. With the ability to shape and guide the economy, the 
government created optimal conditions for the businesses to rapidly expand. The 
country’s growth results demonstrated that the economic miracle did occur under an 
illiberal economy. All the meanwhile, throughout Park’s reign, checks and balances on 
the private sector were implemented to regulate the chaebols replacing the “invisible 
hand” of the market.  
1. 3rd and 4th Republics (1962–1979) 
a. Political Reform 
Political leadership was the main factor determining the country’s future with the 
dawn of the 3rd Republic. At the time, South Korea’s political, economic, and social 
infrastructures were debilitated by war and political turmoil. Assuming the responsibility 
to take on the challenge of rebuilding national institutions, Park Chung Hee usurped the 
presidency at a critical state and was in no position to patiently wait for the economy to 
mature. Mercantilists stress that the role of the government is essential in formulating and 
implementing national economic policies in order to salvage the economy from crises and 
mitigate the dangers to an unregulated economy.  Once in power, mercantilism was the 
main prescription that Park subscribed to. The process began by centralizing various 
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facets of society. Similar to Japan’s “plan rational” economy, adopted from Germany’s 
planwirtshaft, the Korean government focused on “industrial policy” and intentionally 
altered economic conditions to achieve its goals.50 “Chungboo chishi” or ‘government 
instructions’ were commonplace in all aspects of the infrastructural development 
especially the economic sector where the state demonstrated the paternalistic role during 
the initial phases of South Korea’s economic growth.51 To Park’s advantage, with the 
country’s past history of compromised autonomy and capacity, legitimacy was naturally 
attained and nationalism was easily fueled to garner support from the people. Historical 
precedents based on both previously failed domestic institutions and international shocks 
helped justify the authoritarian regime beginning in the 1960s. Moreover, as the country 
remained as a poor third world country, political validation was simply hinged upon 
economic performance for the time being.  
Nonetheless, accumulating capital in a post conflict environment required drastic 
changes. Shifting the macroeconomic focus from the 1950s strategy that emphasized a 
strictly import-substitution policy, Park aggressively pursued export oriented policies in 
order to commit the country towards industrialization.52 Furthermore, international 
competitiveness was to be attained by increasing domestic capacity, necessitating an 
array of policies cultivating an environment conducive for entrepreneurship. The state 
directly regulated the import and export environment allowing capital to be efficiently 
allocated towards investments. The World Bank summarized the South Korean 
government’s approach as comprehensive “selective intervention,” with “import controls 
under import subsidized industrialization (ISI) to include protectionist policies, tariffs, 
quotas, licenses,” and “export promotion/credit subsidies” promoting EOI to allow 
foreign direct investments; furthermore, “agricultural subsidies,” “public-private 
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cooperation [through] deliberation councils,” and “currency manipulation” kept exchange 
rates low to encourage exports and engineered mild financial repressions for investing.53  
Arguing that the Korean state played an oversized role in achieving economic 
development, Amsden states even more forcefully that Park essentially acted as South 
Korea’s “invisible hand” creating market conditions to include “price controls, 
restrictions on capacity expansions, limits on market entry, prohibitions on capital flight, 
restraints on tax evasion, and government control over the banking system.”54 With an 
effective operational state, the administration successfully unshackled exports with a 
dirigiste strategy of industrialization in order to eliminate the unnecessary trade barriers, 
all the while maintaining political stability, allowing society to invest in a burgeoning 
economy that projected growth. The myriad of political institutions set ideal market 
operating conditions to institute the transition towards having the private sector become 
the main driver for national economic growth. 
b. State Led Chaebol Inception 
South Korea’s mercantilist growth strategy successfully identified and integrated 
key institutions for growth. Much like Japan’s growth formula, which consisted of the 
“mighty trio”—“state organization, central banking, and zaibatsu conglomerates,” the 
South Korean approach consisted of two key players—the government and the chaebol 
conglomerates, with the state as the dominant actor.55 Essentially, the onset of the high 
growth phase was made possible by the initial political bargain between state and 
business, which yielded rapid industrialization. And it was none other than the 
government that allowed the establishment of the “chaebols,” family-run companies that 
grew to become conglomerates, as a national institution. The business-political alliance 
had become the cornerstone of President Park’s initial growth policies and the economic 
prosperity that followed strengthened his legitimacy.  
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From an operational frame of reference, the state had chosen the chaebols to be 
guaranteed market winners. To actively commit and guarantee success of the political 
economic partnership, the government assumed control over various sectors. The 
extensive interventionist system not only allowed the state to pick which companies to 
win but also allocated government bureaucrats to political and private sectors, including 
banking and corporations, which were formally and informally associated with the 
state.56 The government provided not only a favorable environment for businesses that 
assisted the state’s goals but also safety measures. The entrepreneurial risks that were to 
be addressed during the nascency of growth were: “pricing collapse through 
overproduction, competition from cheap imports, and losses through exporting.”57 In lieu 
of a mature market that played these roles, the state acted as the “entrepreneur, banker, 
and shaper of the industrial structure” and “deliberately distorted the price structure.”58 
Controlling the traffic of capital, the government backed the businesses that were 
essential to the economy by incentivizing growth with subsidies and protection measures. 
Companies that abided by the government priorities were allowed to borrow from 
domestic and international banks “beyond net worth.”59 In short, the state shepherded 
businesses to boom in order to transform the domestic market to a competitive economy. 
c. Initial Checks and Balances 
Successfully balancing business and politics in South Korea’s economic 
modernization required a collectivized effort. The future of national growth was feasible 
by way of integrating top-down and bottom-up processes as well as lateral cooperation. 
Throughout the 3rd and 4th Republic, checks and balances existed between the state and 
businesses that allowed durable growth and stability. Priority on human capital 
development in the sense of meritocratic bureaucracy ultimately led to the accumulation 
of physical capital, a sound financial market, and stable macroeconomic management; 
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furthermore, a capable bureaucracy played a crucial role in the reciprocal “state-society 
interface.”60 The personnel of these bureaucracies were first selected based on merit, then 
the state empowered them in their respective specialties by insulating them from other 
agencies by law, in order to employ policies towards “shared growth.”61 Park’s 
bureaucratic institutions served a dual function—assisting as a conduit and intermediary 
between the government and private sector and enforcing responsible political and 
business practices.  
The Economic Planning Board, an effective bureaucratic organization, served as 
the primary medium to drive both government and business interests. The EPB, founded 
on July 22, 1961 and comprised of the country’s top university graduates, centralized and 
rationalized economic decision making and implementation, playing the role of 
coordinating the ministries of “Finance, commerce and Industry, Transportation, 
Agriculture, Health and Social Affairs, and Science and Technology.”62 At the time, 
South Korea was catching up to the rest of the modern nations and was easier to choose 
the industries rather than gambling on technologies that would lead the future.63 
Furthermore, the country did not have the acumen, lacking entrepreneurs and scientists to 
spearhead the markets’ frontiers.64 To answer the private sector’s dilemma of lacking 
experience in growing firms, the EPB sufficiently filled the country’s entrepreneurial 
talent void and made the strategic investment in heavy and chemical industrialization 
(HCI).65 The EPB also generated sustainable and collective growth by adapting to the 
feedback from the businesses, which allowed the state to pragmatically tailor future 
policies. Initially, the bureaucratic system may have been formed for economic interests 
but it also limited the dangers of both excessive authoritarian rule and pervasive 
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corruption, with internal checks and balances. Adhering to progressive practicality, Park 
allowed participation of the various economic sectors to have a stake in national policies. 
Improving upon the modes of communication, accountability, and transparency, the state-
business relationship matured rapidly in depth and scope resulting in high economic 
growth.  
Conventionally, the correct understanding of “Korea, Inc.,”—unlike “Japan, Inc.” 
where government and business were on relatively equal standing with each other—
emphasizes that the chaebol were predominantly led by the state.66 This was a valid 
statement only during the 3rd and 4th Republic. Not only did Park have extensive ties to 
politics from his military background, he created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA) in 1961, located in Namsan of Seoul, in order to prevent the domestic North 
Korean threat but also to enforce politicians, businessmen, and media personnel.67 When 
Park launched South Korea’s 4th Republic in 1972, amendments to the constitution and 
new yushin system, modeled after the iishin system of Meiji Japan, prioritized “loyalty 
and filial piety” that would be the national mottos throughout state led economic 
development and corporate growth.68 Under the yushin system, Park would further 
strengthen the executive position, which meant that his guidance was not to be challenged 
and the chaebols stayed untouched but also contained with such an influential chief. 
Meanwhile, “Korea, Inc.” also indicates the dawn of a national economic institution 
where the state relied heavily on the private sector. From the perspective of the chaebols, 
they also had to survive within the market. As a result, the conglomerates naturally 
capitalized on the political relationship with the state and began to champion competition 
within the economy as well.  
d. Unnatural Market Conditions 
Critiquing Park’s tenure in terms of economic security, which in South Korea’s 
case meant protecting the free market from internal institutions, two issues need to be 
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addressed: sustainability and substitutability. The existence of an authoritarian regime 
and its pursuit to establish a competitive free market economy pose significant risks. 
Overly focused on promoting specific sectors, the plan rational economy was not 
beneficial to the rest of the country; therefore, the positive transitions towards a 
completely free market economy were missing. This meant that the political economic 
structure did not account for preparing for alternative institutions to the chaebols and 
mitigating the socio-economic risks. In turn, these precedents affected how the market 
was shaped, in particular deterring market efficiency as a result of binding state 
intervention. Those who were excluded from political priorities were political-economic 
losers. In a profit based zero sum game within the market, the conglomerates quickly 
established organizational autonomy and capacity eventually monopolizing various 
sectors. If the state were to lose control over the private sector, the balance of economic 
power would shift to the chaebol and the oligarchs at their heads.  
Underlying the economic successes of Park’s rule, South Korea’s market 
economy was beginning to develop unnaturally. By the end of the 1970s, challenges with 
the “distortion of the competitive market structure, misallocation of resources, and severe 
inflationary pressure and unbalanced development of the industrial structure” remained 
unresolved.69 Further aggravating the natural development of the free market system, 
“growth first and distribution later” caused wealth inequality while Park was not ready to 
allocate the country’s tax to balance the amplifying economic deficiencies.70 Although 
initial mercantilist policies yielded transition from ISI to EOI along with high growth, 
favoritism towards the chaebols thwarted the country’s long term entrepreneurship. And 
as South Korea’s human capital evolved, the social, political, and economic conditions 
warranting interventionism changed requiring decisive adjustments to policies. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The initial phase of South Korea’s industrialization began with a political 
revolution. After the coup d’état, Park took control over South Korea’s commanding 
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heights and adhered to the fundamentals of mercantilist theory. Foregoing the option to 
patiently allow the market to develop, South Korea’s security conditions warranted 
expedited industrialization and the dictator bypassed liberalization to justify accelerated 
economic progress based on interventionism. The state during Park’s era was 
predominantly a “‘comprehensive’ developmental state,” which focused on development 
placing industrial policy at the core of the political agenda.71  
As economic growth became the raison d’état of the state, unorthodox practices 
were implemented to accumulate capital. Given the country’s distraught conditions, the 
chaebols were crucial allies for the South Korean leadership at the time in order to 
achieve industrial power. Park successfully incorporated two elements of political 
economic growth. With an initial focus on building human capital, in the form of a 
capable bureaucracy, the decision to utilize the private sector, specifically the chaebols 
paid off to increase the country’s physical capital and thereby drive economic growth.  
Although a pragmatic authoritarian leader thus produced quickly accelerating 
growth, with so much of the political economic power concentrated, it was apparent that 
maintaining a state led partnership with the private sector was not sustainable. The use of 
the chaebols can be lauded as necessary political risk; meanwhile, the over reliance on 
the chaebols began to create imbalances that impacted the market economy’s future. 
Without a longer term contingency plan for continuity, the political transition to another 
leader portended further changes in the balance of economic power between the state and 
the chaebols. Since the comprehensive developmental state is inherently a transitory state 
susceptible to internal and external pressures, institutional transitions were imperative in 
South Korea as economic conditions precipitated changes to industrial policies that 
specifically facilitated the chaebols, especially in the heavy and chemical industries.72 
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IV. POLITICAL TRANSITIONS AND MARKET 
VULNERABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the 4th Republic, South Korea’s political economic balance became 
susceptible to its first transitional vulnerability. The conditions were especially volatile 
since the changeover was overnight and in conjunction with another military coup. Soon 
after Park’s assassination, with the change in the political interests and environment, the 
yushin system intended to further strengthen state control was terminated overnight. In 
the midst of uncertainty, the relationship between the state and chaebols inevitably 
changed with a different political economic environment developed by another 
authoritarian leader. With the a new Republic and during the changeover, the head of 
state, General Chun Doo Hwan, retained most of the executive powers exercised by Park 
and the continuation of authoritarianism was clear in how the military killed and violated 
civil rights during the 1980 Kwangju uprising.73 With ongoing political unrest caused by 
the unions, student anti-American movement, and opposition parties, the ruling party was 
forced to concentrate efforts on maintaining support for current regime and disrupted the 
state’s economic centralization.74 Predictably, implementation of imprecise economic 
policies and changes to the well run bureaucracy stifled state capacity. Carrying out the 
plans promoting market liberalization was simply done at the wrong time when the 
chaebols were beginning to absorb all facets of economic production leaving the rest of 
economy unprotected. The political blunder proved to be fatal as it fueled the 
conglomerates’ organizational growth not just in terms of economics but politically and 
socially as well.     
Without sound and sustaining institutions based on rule of law, reactionary 
policies were unable to contain the chaebols and the expression “Korea, Inc.” coined a 
national economy led by the business sector. As priority was given to heavy and chemical 
industries (HCI), dismissing necessary growth of small and medium sized enterprises, the 
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chaebols were able to monopolize industries and continue to advance their interests 
within the “free” market economy. And since the overall economic system had not yet 
matured to a self-regulated economy, the balance soon shifted towards the chaebols, 
which exploited the government policies that were intended to promote national 
wellbeing. No longer under comprehensive government scrutiny, the chaebols 
maximized their autonomy and capacity. As a result, industrial growth policies were 
capitalized by businesses that began to cartelize the market and the methods of 
government control were weakened. Additionally, as the economy matured, the 
government’s support was not only excessive but was becoming unnecessary for the 
chaebols. In due course, the state became completely dependent on the conglomerates as 
the businesses took control over the nation’s powers of production. Although growth was 
occurring, the economy dominated by the chaebols led to a worsening in socio-economic 
conditions as the state was no longer capable of effectively preserving societal interest in 
the capitalist system. 
B. THE 5TH REPUBLIC (1979–1988): THE FIRST TRANSITIONAL 
VULNERABILITY—DANGERS OF AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITIONS 
1. The Decreasing Political Stake 
President Chun Doo Hwan’s efforts to adjust the economic environment during 
the 5th Republic exposed the economy to the chaebols. First, he altered the bureaucracy 
that served as an effective intermediary providing oversight of the nation’s economic 
trajectory. After his military coup d’etat in December of 1979, under the slogan “Just 
Society” Chun’s new campaign retired 8,000 civil servants, along with Park’s political 
guard including members of the majority and minority parties, and placed the media 
under the government. As a result, the crucial institutional checks and balances over the 
chaebols were stifled. Weakening the bureaucracy translated into waning liability and 
visibility of the private sector. As the state reduced its own intermediary role, the 
government was no longer able to effectively coordinate its agenda with the businesses. 
South Korea’s Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 1982–1986 
specifically intended to promote autonomy of overall market investment decisions to the 
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private sector and decrease government intervention.75  The new economic strategy was 
implemented with inopportune timing as the FDI increased and export sectors remained 
at the forefront of growth. At this juncture, the relationship of the two institutions evolved 
from “state dominance to symbiosis and [eventually] to competition.”76 In the end, the 
state was losing its lead position in the once joint process of successfully carrying out 
economic initiatives. The once collectivized process that married the state and chaebols 
to maximize equity and stimulate constructive partnerships in pursuit of the national 
interest was transforming into an exclusively private endeavor.  
Correctional measures undertaken by Chun were not decisive enough to balance 
the market by reducing the chaebol presence.  The state failed to address the regulatory 
function due to the pursuit of “fair competition and consumer protection” and did not 
require the chaebols with high debt/asset ratios to repay loans, leaving the people’s assets 
via the government in the possession of the conglomerates.77 With the chaebols in 
control of the heavy production sectors, small and medium businesses were occupied 
with investing in “leisure services” while the larger companies dominated the country’s 
real estate and development projects.78 Furthermore, the chaebols’ were now afforded the 
opportunity to attract and venture into international market territories. By 1981, Chun 
authorized “joint ventures with foreign banks” despite the Fair Trade Law preventing 
“anticompetitive mergers, unfair advertising, and restrictive trade practices; in 1984, the 
Tariff Reform Act phased reductions in tariff levels and charges to create uniformity of 
tariff levels.”79  
In short, Chun’s era evolved towards a “‘limited’ developmental state,” a hybrid 
of plan rational and market rational management, which works to support developmental 
policy goals along with foreign policy and welfare.80 Although the intent was to reduce 
                                                 
75 Tony Michell, From a Developing to a Newly Industrialized Country: The Republic of Korea, 
1961–82 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1988), 75.  
76 Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 5. 
77 Kim, “An Introduction to the Korean Model of Political Economy,” 54. 
78 Ibid., 55.  
79 Ibid., 53. 
80 Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 5; Johnson, “MITI and the Japanese Miracle,” 270–271. 
 34
government control over investment guidance and to expose industries to “market forces 
and external competition,” Chun failed to address comprehensive restructuring of the 
legal “market rational” institutions prior to liberalization as unfair rules allowed the 
chaebols to continuously thrive throughout private sector.81 In a weak rule of law 
context, other institutional checks and balances were crucial: “bureaucracy checks the 
excesses of the business enterprises, the legislature checks the excesses of the 
bureaucracy, and a free press serves as a check on the three players including itself.”82 
Since the Korean government failed to guarantee the necessary market protection 
measures, the national economy was not an impartial playing field for all companies. The 
market imbalance and government political focus provided ample opportunity for the 
chaebols to increase their influence in the financial sectors.  
2. Chaebol Take Over 
The change in interests, conditions, and the environment provided the chaebols 
impeccable timing to fully capitalize on the transitional vulnerability that opened during 
South Korea’s 5th Republic and become the lead element for the country’s transition 
towards capitalism. The chaebols were not complacent with state assistance. They 
expanded autonomy and capacity by expanding to new markets, investing in technology 
and partnering with multinational corporations making themselves indispensable for the 
nation’s TFP efforts.83 The timing, beginning in 1979, for organizational expansion was 
ripe as the state pursued a new direction for the economy with focus on trade and 
financial liberalization.84 As a result, the government focused on small and medium 
business growth with “minimized credit allocation, forcing companies to rely more on 
stock offerings and borrowing on the open market,” and “selling commercial banks to 
private shareholders, establishing new financial institutions.”85 Once the state 
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relinquished the means for credit allocation to the private sector, the chaebols were no 
longer beholden to the government. The state, no longer equipped with the ability to 
intervene in the chaebols’ operations through market share, was unable to rectify the 
incomplete policies intended to transition towards an efficiently competitive free market 
economy.  
As a consequence, Chun’s political strategy sped the chaebols’ ascent as the 
country’s oligarchy. Additionally, during the world recession of the 1980s, Chun was 
focused on controlling price stabilities and neglected to deal with “financially insolvent 
firms.”86 Without a contingency plan for replacing the bankrupt “shipping companies, 
overseas construction companies, and general trading companies,” the government was 
forced to provide relief funds.87 As a solution to the failing businesses, Chun allowed 
other conglomerates to take over the firms and under the revised “Law Governing Tax 
Reduction and Exemptions,” exempting property and transfer taxes for mergers. 88 
Unsurprisingly the market started to operate under “private-sector industrial guidance,” 
more specifically a “[chaebol]-guidance” model.89 As government control of the 
chaebols significantly weakened, the conglomerates were now in control of South 
Korea’s commanding heights.       
The chaebols ensured that they became inextricably interconnected to the 
country’s economic survival. As the chaebols focused on export capacity and increased 
industrial readiness, the successes of the businesses were soon becoming the source of 
political legitimacy as well. By the late 1980s, the chaebols gained increased freedom as 
“corporate growth and the stock market” become the sources of “financial support” in 
place of the government.90 No longer was it feasible for the state to sufficiently regulate 
the growing conglomerates. The absence of institutional safeguards to prevent the 
expansion of the chaebols and lost timing led to an imbalance between the state and the 
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chaebols. Because piecemeal reconstruction efforts by the government failed to retain 
economic jurisdiction, the chaebols not only assumed the driving role in the economy but 
also asserted their presence in the political realm.   
Lastly, the chaebols paralyzed the bureaucracy’s capacity with systemic 
corruption. A principal cause for the government’s weak ability to police the state-
business relationship was due to the political buy-off affecting policies at all levels 
involving “military officers, politicians, bureaucrats, bankers, businessmen, and tax 
collectors.”91 To the chaebols, it was no hard feat as rule of law and “government 
intervention [degenerated] into ‘rent seeking’” in the midst of economic success.92 The 
government and the industries had been working hand in hand for decades while state 
oversight was pervasive. Reversing the roles of influence, this worked in favor of the 
chaebols since they knew how the government operated as experienced veterans of a 
once flourishing partnership. With decreased state oversight, bribery became rampant 
especially as the politicians required funding during the election campaigns, a “quasi-
institutionalized” tit-for-tat norm that was commonplace since Park’s era.93 The 
chaebols’ accumulation of more wealth and power under the conditions prescribed by 
Chun soon led to high levels of political funding. A deeper issue to the cancer of 
corruption was the inability to recognize how corruption functioned to shroud the 
decision making process and corroded the nation’s economic security. The chaebols’ 
greed that advanced their ambitions led to South Korea’s administrative breakdown as 
well as subsequent financial, social, and political costs.   
3. Distorted Market Conditions 
In order to advance a country’s long-term capitalist competitiveness, a self-
correcting efficient market is desired for the sake of sustainable competitive advantage. 
Unnecessary government intervention that will prevent natural efficiency of the “invisible 
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hand” and prevent competition will deteriorate the national economy from within.94 Yet, 
in South Korea, the sudden shift in political focus towards macro market liberalization 
policies in order to correct mercantilism of the 60s and 70s, came with a concurrent loss 
in relevance of equally important microeconomic institutions. The domestic problems 
were masked by South Korea’s overall growth due to “sharp decline in international oil 
prices, the fall in international interest rates, and the appreciation of the Japanese yen.”95 
By the 1980s, the state’s industrial policies were shaping an unnatural economy, which 
was leading towards developing trends of monopolization that were no longer correctable 
while the country continued to grow economically under false premises. Long-term 
stability grounded on a market rational system or a laissez-faire economy proved 
impossible for Korea. Without healthy competition and entrepreneurship, a self-
correcting “invisible hand” did not exist. Previous government intervention and chaebol 
monopolization of the market made the transition to a free market economy difficult. And 
as long as the chaebols controlled the majority of the country’s means of production, the 
transition towards a liberal market economy was becoming unattainable.  
Not only was the state reliant upon the chaebols for physical capital, but the 
modes of innovation needed to sustain growth were becoming inefficient. As adverse 
national economic institutions were becoming permanently embedded, the market 
became rigid with restricted avenues of growth. The government’s continuing investment 
distortions forced small and medium size firms to pursue leisure services while the larger 
businesses focused on heavy industries and real estate, to include commercial building 
and redevelopment projects. Essentially, the erosion of competitiveness created 
substantial gaps within the economy that lacked asset investments and bullish trade 
liberalization reforms worsened the national foreign debt. By 1983, the top five business 
groups, Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Sunkyung, and Daewoo, accumulated 
approximately 50 billion dollars in sales, which equated to over 50 percent of South 
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Korea’s gross national production (GNP).96 With most of the country’s capital tied to the 
operations of the chaebols, the allocation of South Korea’s resources remained confined 
and improperly distributed.   
The deteriorating political economic balance precipitated social imbalances and 
the wide gap between the rich and poor remained during the periods of growth. From 
1965 to 1980, the country’s income distribution of the top 20 percent of households 
remained above 40 percent; with the middle 40 percent of households earning about 35 
percent and the bottom 40 percent consistently under 20 percent.97 Labor, which had 
been unrepresented and excluded from the state-business partnership since the beginning, 
became a ubiquitous force for democratization and social change by 1980s.98 
Furthermore, underlying the inaccurately perceived stability, the country continued to 
suffer internally from the lack of “income distribution, labor management relations, and 
social welfare.”99 Instead of facilitating a healthy division of labor, the chaebols dictated 
the value of labor as they dominated the industries and obstructed diversification of 
production. Furthermore, the strictly top down organizational structure of the chaebols 
cannibalized the country’s workforce. The country’s leaders failed to realize that the 
litmus test of a healthy economy lies within the well-being of the people.  
C. 6TH REPUBLIC: THE SECOND TRANSITIONAL VULNERABILITY—
POINT OF NO RETURN 
1. Introduction 
At the dawn of South Korea’s 6th Republic, South Korea’s new democracy was 
becoming more susceptible to the pressure from the international community to integrate 
into the globalized political economy, following the 1988 Seoul Olympic games.100 
However, the timing and the internal environment merely presented the country’s second 
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transitional vulnerability for the chaebols as the ill prepared economy was launched into 
the foreign market system. Nominally marking the end of authoritarian rule, continuing 
deterioration of political, economic, and social institutions further provided the chaebols 
opportune timing to further their standing as South Korea’s most dominant organization. 
As another former military leader assumed the presidency behind the veneer of 
democracy, correcting political instabilities caused by party factionalism became the 
foremost priority of the state. In the midst of stagnating domestic politics, liberalization 
of foreign policy allowed the economy to expand towards the international market sooner 
than expected. Given the circumstances, the state began to completely lose accountability 
and transparency of the private sector as the chaebols usurped the market economy by 
integrating South Korea to foreign capital. The political economic vulnerabilities not only 
provided prime conditions for the conglomerates to grow but with the nation’s future 
linked to the success of the chaebols the private sector was now situated to control the 
national agenda without interference. 
2. Roh Tae Woo (1988–1993) 
a. Expansionist Foreign Policy Reform 
With capitalism linking countries to one another, soft power politics became a 
new mechanism that the state was required to employ. Following events that inspired 
South Korea’s foreign policy perestroika, it was none other than the chaebols that were 
entrusted with the obligation to spearhead the country’s new age expansion that linked 
politics with economics. At this time, the chaebols had already been funded with “low 
interest-rate loans” by the government and an export boom from 1986 to 1988 with the 
rising yen generated continued profits without state support.101 The state now relied on 
the chaebols for both political funding and success of the national economy; during this 
time, senior level business leaders began to enter politics as well.102 Responding to the 
chaebols’ request to support increasing the country’s competitiveness, Roh’s “Sixth Five-
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Year Economic and Social Development Plan” focused on outward growth.103 
Meanwhile, not having resolved the symptoms of “compressed modernization” leading to 
domestic “economic imbalances,” including “concentration of economic power and 
inequalities of income and wealth,” the political leadership’s diplomatic decision to 
advance a liberal approach to foreign policy enabled a more aggressive business 
mindset.104 With the novel expansionist political strategy, the economic sectors were to 
follow suit. At this juncture, the state was not ready to actively operate and exchange 
mass foreign capital as the country as a collective entity suffered from fragile institutions.  
b. Democratic Nascence 
With the balance of political-economic power already swayed towards the 
chaebols, the state was in dire need of decisive reform. Meanwhile, feeble foundations of 
the liberal political structure presented itself as an internal roadblock and creating yet 
another deficiency. The beginning years of Korea’s 6th Republic reinstated democratic 
rule but the regime’s capacity was debilitated by political paralysis and national turmoil. 
In 1987, the first democratic presidential election since 1971 was held with Roh Tae-woo 
winning the presidency with 36.6 of the electoral votes.105 Unfortunately, despite Roh’s 
victory, his party lost the National Assembly elections in April of 1988 and ceded the 
majority. With the sudden changeover following the four decades of authoritarianism, the 
new political freedoms and pluralism led to a great deal of contention leveled at the 
Korean government regarding “rice-pricing policy, social welfare expenditure, trade 
policy and even defense expenditures.”106 To worsen matters, another national issue at 
the time that was the regional patterns of voting that created political and economic 
polarizations strictly based on the country’s geographic locations.107  
Lacking a unified consensus, laissez faire governance created uncertainty and 
doubt. With the1989 National Assembly special hearing of the 1980 Kwangju massacre, 
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which both Presidents Chun and Roh were actively involved in, the attention towards 
economic policies became secondary and the controversial political atmosphere muddled 
the state’s credibility. Additionally, during Roh’s presidency, national issues including 
protracted labor disputes, genuine volatility of real estate speculation, Reverend Moon’s 
illegal visit to North Korea, prevailing violence on university campuses, and widespread 
social crimes caused incessant instability.108 The diminishing economic focus of the state 
was evident during the democratic transition as the ability to govern was debilitated by 
political disorder. The unreliable government was no longer efficient or effective and 
inflexible state capacity caused perils for South Korea’s economy.   
c. Adverse Market Conditions and Socio Political Culture 
South Korean growth soared in the late 1980s, reaching an all-time high in 1988 
with 6.8 percent growth (see Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1.  South Korea GDP Growth Rate 1987–1990 
But society from top to bottom was also suffering from an illusion of wealth.109 
Macroeconomic obscurity ensued as the state was unable to provide clear direction with 
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the “coexistence of liberalism and state corporatism” creating confusion while businesses 
were competing against one another to secure government benefits instead of 
concentrating on developing competitive advantages with technological innovations.110 
As the state was unable to accurately gauge what appropriate reform for long term 
stability was needed, its reliance on the chaebols for economic dynamism continued. 
Constantly allowing the chaebols to take greater risk, state-backed operations created 
moral hazard with higher stakes. To worsen matters, with the Olympics and profits from 
real estate and the stock market from 1986–1988, an overconfident public created an 
exorbitant spending culture with “extravagant luxury consumption.”111 Within the 
business sector, distorted corporate speculation based on excessive greed allocated 
savings earnings toward “nonproductive investments” and in 1989, real estate 
speculations skyrocketed.112 As the chaebols’ expansion created a national asset bubble, 
fear of inflation permeated society. 
Throughout the 6th Republic, continued corruption between the private sector and 
government caused public distrust. During his political reign, it was reported that Roh 
secured over $240 million to his political party for normal operating expenses and 
disbursed $40 million to constituents, all the while, personally raising at least $800 
million in private funds.113 As Koo Ja-kyung, chairman of LG and the Federation of 
Korean Industries (FKI) retaliated to deregulations stating that political contributions 
would only go towards politicians willing to support businesses, Roh discarded his anti-
chaebol campaign.114 With an uncertain economic environment, accurate calculation of 
risks that was vital to sustaining stable long term capital management was becoming 
impossible. As market signals were distorted and dismissed, the country continued 
operate without authentic evaluation of market conditions. Since the state was no longer a 
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major player in market operations, it haplessly left market forces to self-correct. As a 
consequence, the growing chaebol-led economy that reached out to foreign markets and 
risked external exposure.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The 5th Republic marked a turning point for the South Korean economy as the 
balance between state and business waned and the evolution of the term “Korea, Inc.” 
defined an era of chaebol-led growth. During the authoritarian transition, political 
vulnerabilities led to the establishment of an oppressive economic environment. As the 
government stymied its own capabilities by eliminating essential bureaucratic functions 
and diminishing organizational capacity, the state began to relinquish its systems of 
oversight over the chaebols. Soon after, as economic conditions outpaced faulty policies, 
the private sector took control of the commanding heights. The high expectations for the 
regime following the era of industrialization were never met. Without the ability to 
manage the chaebols via effective rule of law institutions, the government became 
dependent on them for economic growth and political legitimacy. At the dawn of the new 
democratic Republic, the authoritarian transition of Chun’s era had yielded not only 
distorted market and social conditions but permitted the chaebol reign to be 
comprehensive and pervasive within the South Korean economy.   
Despite the political transitions, South Korea’s market economy were unable to 
dismantle the oligarchs. The chaebols thrived in both “defensive industrial policies, [in 
which the state aimed to] preserve existing structures, maintain employment, and protect 
beleaguered industries” and “adaptive industrial policies [that] encouraged and facilitated 
industrial change by providing resources from aging or declining sectors to more 
productive sectors.”115  In fact, the state was not only unable to regulate the private sector 
but bolstered the chaebols’ autonomy with liberalization policies that expedited 
organizational growth towards the regional markets. In sum, Chun and Roh’s laissez-faire 
economic policies were “institutionally inappropriate” to the country’s market 
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conditions.116 No longer limited to domestic production, the scale of operations for the 
conglomerates increased dramatically. Without a regulatory system of checks and 
balances, the South Korean economy was not ready to engage with economies abroad. 
The indication of a fragile economic system was evident in the nation’s political 
infrastructure. With relentless discord among the various parties, mobilizing a cohesive 
government agency that would be able to take part in the ownership of the commanding 
heights seemed impossible. As a result, the basic procedure of monitoring the market was 
disabled. Moreover, unstable institutions permeated across the country creating volatile 
socio-economic conditions. With the international market now impacting the domestic 
economy, the severity of the dangers to an unregulated private sector equated to risks that 
would jeopardize the entire country. Precariously, as the politically backed chaebols 
controlled the state business partnership, both factions were now committed to each 
other’s success and failure.  
 
 
                                                 
116 Cho and Kim, “A New Vision for Institutional Reforms,” 708. 
 45
V. THE 1997 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND CRISIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The survival of the chaebols as an institution through both a catastrophic 
economic crisis and a major regulatory reform attests to their durability. A series of 
mistakes by the government continuously delayed the consequences of the oligarchic 
concentration of economic activity. Squandering yet another momentous possibility of 
breaking up the conglomerates in order to regain its position over the commanding 
heights, the state heightened economic exposure to adverse market shocks. As moral 
hazard and corruption disrupted the country’s policies and capital over the years with 
endless accumulation of foreign debt, an economic meltdown was unavoidable. In 1997, 
South Korea finally bore the brunt of its decision for having a chaebol-led economy as 
the region wide Asian financial crisis required a colossal International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) bailout.     
Authoritarian or illiberal mechanisms were not strictly limited to political 
environments as the chaebols continued to dominate the economy. Prior to causing a 
national economic meltdown, by 1996, the “top 30 conglomerates” owned and produced 
half of all equity and sales in the country’s private sector; the “top five conglomerates” 
accounted for 55percent of “all domestic bank loans” in 1997.117 A correlation from 
political systems can be made upon economic environments as well. Examining the high 
growth of illiberal Asian states, a form of “mature authoritarianism” evolved, with 
diversified institutional measures to secure legitimacy and ease the transition from “hard 
to soft authoritarianism.”118 This perspective can also explain the chaebols’ maturing and 
creeping institutionalism in the political economy. With the breadth and depth of the 
ubiquitous corruption mechanisms, the chaebols seized the political and economic 
domains. And as the political leadership became further dependent on the chaebols, the 
private sector disregarded rule of law, which spawned moral hazards. Lacking 
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alternatively superior modes of production and innovation at both pre and post crisis 
periods, the chaebols remained as an integral institution throughout South Korea’s global 
growth throughout the twenty-first century.   
B. KIM YOUNG SAM (1993–1998) 
1. Segyehwa Campaign 
With another transition of political leadership and accurate understanding of the 
need for globalization, conceptualizing the early stages towards improving the economy 
was on point. When Kim Young Sam was elected president, the country was led by its 
first civilian government in 30 years. His legacy was his “segyehwa” or globalization 
campaign aimed not only at economic but also political, cultural, and social liberalization 
as well.119 The initiative was to better accommodate “a set of processes of stretching and 
intensifying worldwide interconnectedness” that aimed to incorporate all areas of the 
country’s infrastructures.120 The primary goal of the country in order to achieve a 
globalized market oriented environment was to eventually liberalize trade and open the 
financial markets. Fueling social mobilization, North Korea’s aggressive threats against 
the South’s new movement gave more media exposure.121  
Meanwhile, with more economic success resulting in U.S. and Japan pressuring to 
further liberalize import and financial markets in addition to competition among the other 
newly industrializing countries (NIC) in Asia that began to provide cheaper labor, the 
Korean manufacturing exports sectors required advances in innovation; hence, the focus 
shifted towards research and development to provide “higher value-added production”122 
The chaebols aggressively pursued periphery enterprises in “Europe, Southeast Asia, and 
former communist bloc” with foreign direct investments in those countries catapulting 
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from 32 million dollars in 1985 to 1 billion dollars by 1991.123 Domestically, subsidiary 
companies of the top 30 chaebols increased dramatically from an average of 4.2 in 1970s 
to 26.7 by 1997.124  In order to prepare the country to compete internationally, Kim 
Young Sam first reinforced “localization (deglobalization)” to enhance domestic 
production and independent industrial capacity as globalization necessitated “greater 
deregulation, decentralization, and democratization.”125 While initial planning and 
policies for progress addressed national necessities that provided a sense of hope and 
direction, the feasibility of executing the national schema against the growing chaebols 
remained questionable.  
2. Proposed Reform and Consequences of Indecision 
As the president called upon institutional changes, the state appeared to be 
regaining its influence vis-à-vis the business sector. With a clear trajectory established by 
Kim, the government had another opportunity to implement disciplined economic reform 
processes. The reform strategy was comprehensive but required execution with critical 
aggressiveness. The schema was to be carried out in three primary areas that would 
address the economic structure, investment strategy, and political reform by means of 
“deconcentration of chaebols; external opening and liberalization; and a deepening of 
democratization.”126 This was once again, a state driven top down operation that required 
immediate action since the symptoms of economic authoritarianism were beginning to 
affect political outlook. The main objective of deconcentration was to first cultivate 
healthy domestic competition that would stabilize domestic economic conditions in order 
to prepare for the next required stage of reform of opening up to the external markets. In 
conjunction with U.S. pressure for Korea’s economic liberalization, the economic 
environment required “technological innovation and increased capital mobility” in order 
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to meet the challenges of the global markets.127 Finally, democratization would allow 
responsible allocation of resources to include welfare spending, “redistribution of income 
from capital to labor, and social inclusion” that would re-integrate a burgeoning middle 
class to the economic system.128 If the aforementioned plan was to be executed properly, 
policy objectives would eventually restore the balance of the state-business relationship 
and resolve social, economic, and political issues throughout the process.  
Despite the grandeur of the reform blueprint, Kim Young Sam’s leadership failed 
to deliver South Korea’s much needed lasting change and reform due to indecision. 
Bureaucratic entities offered different courses of action in regards to prioritizing the 
president’s reform policies. In 1994, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) recommended 
the need to open the market system to better utilize the international production forces 
and attract foreign investment, which would require the government to “ceasing [the] 
practice of market intervention and removing regulations.”129 Moreover, support for 
South Korea’s accession to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) was not only to increase competitiveness and gain better access to 
foreign technology but was also to correct labor issues by increasing transparency among 
businesses.130 On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Korea 
cautioned the EPB’s approach due to inherent risks of macroeconomic stability if the 
pace of exposure to the domestic markets were to be too sudden.131  
External opening for the market economy ran the risk of further entrenching the 
chaebols, the conglomerates that have commandeered the entrepreneurial roles, in the 
economic system. Additionally, dependency on the international system would inevitably 
make the market conditions more susceptible to external shocks.132 Kim first chose to 
break up the big businesses. The five year plan during this era that promised “tax, 
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financial, monetary and administrative reforms” in 1993 aimed at enforcing “spending 
and production targets for the private sector and voluntary limits on business expansion 
plans.”133 One course that Kim took was merging the Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
and Ministry of Finance (MOF) into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in 
order to create a more effective system of governance but the oversized and politicized 
bureaucracy was unable maintain manage the various “fiscal, budgetary and other 
important economic functions” making accountability difficult.134 In response the 
chaebols’ national investments decreased and so did overall economic growth in 1993 to 
3.4 percent causing fear of unemployment.135 Failing to follow through with complete 
implementation of anti-chaebol measures, Kim, with the advice given by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), chose to pursue the 
next step in his reform and opened the domestic market. With the chaebols still in control 
of the commanding heights, the conglomerates remained as the center piece for economic 
liberalization. Caving to his middle class constituencies, by 1994, Kim Young Sam took a 
‘reverse course’ on de-concentration and once again, like his predecessors, promoted “big 
business, export promotion, and rapid economic growth.”136 Ultimately, Kim Young 
Sam’s reforms were “insufficient in scope, depth, and speed” and his indecisiveness “lost 
opportunity for sequential reforms.”137 Kim failed to understand the dynamics of 
“advanced developmental capitalism,” which required effective wielding of state power 
to balance the coexistence with a growing private sector.138 As policy initiatives became 
moot with unsuccessful execution of reform measures, chaebols continued to pursue 
unrestrained operations in the absence of antimonopoly measures. 
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3. Pre-IMF Flow of Capital 
By the 1990s, undeterred by political ineptitude, South Korea’s investment 
portfolio was growing at an explosive pace and the uncontrollable economic changes left 
the state helpless. While Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased drastically in 
1985 from $32 million to over $1 billion by 1991, trade was surging as well.139 Sino-
ROK trade alone increased from $40,000 in 1978 to $23.6 billion by 1997.140 “Daily 
turnover in the foreign-exchange markets [rose] from $15 billion in 1973 to $820 billion 
in 1992 and to $1.5 trillion by 1998” and the “volume of international banking 
transactions increased from $265 billion in 1975 to $4.2 trillion in 1994.”141 Also 
catalyzing the burgeoning international business environment, the internet revolution 
precipitated “informationization—a global information-based economy” as global FDI 
inflows and outflows were respectively at $400 billion and $424 billion in 1997, doubling 
figures from 1990.142 The country’s growing physical capital was dominated by the 
private sector. 53,000 parent company Multi-National Corporations (MNC) and 448,000 
foreign affiliates controlled “finance, trade, investment, and production” and with 
decreasing costs of transportation and communication, MNCs were responsible for “70 
percent of world trade, 70 percent of patents and technological transfers, and 80 percent 
of FDI.”143 To the state, the volume of capital flow was simply unmanageable without 
enforceable regulatory institutions, which meant that the conditions for unconditional 
entrepreneurialism and expansion among the South Korean businesses were optimal. The 
changing economic conditions continued to leave the government in a reactive state while 
the chaebols were at the forefront of influencing the international economic operations, 
which increased both organizational autonomy and capacity.  
What caused domestic contagion in South Korea was disproportionate debt. The 
chaebols’ speculative investments made possible by foreign debt aggravated the financial 
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crisis of 1997. Initially, globalization allowed “outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
for the companies.”144 While Korea’s business orientation was becoming outward 
oriented, the government attempted to regulate expansion as the bureacracy attempted to 
control “investment, trade, loans, joint ventures, technology transfer, mergers and 
acquisitions, and other external financial transactions.”145 However, government efforts 
to contain the business sector were futile. The chaebols used “short-term commercial 
borrowings to finance long-term projects” and throughout the 1990s, expansion 
operations took advantage of “economies of scale” to utilize cheaper labor forces and 
foreign technology.146 By 1994, the chaebol OFDI accounted for 70 percent of the 
national OFDI with $1.4 billion.147 Coincidentally, soon after submitting for OECD 
membership in 1994, South Korea’s foreign debt doubled to $157.5 billion in 1996 
accounting for 33 percent of the entire GDP along with $500 billion in overdue loans 
assumed by the South Korean banks.148 With depleted reserves, once the debt was called 
upon, the country had no other option than to file for bankruptcy.  
4. Moral Hazard 
Institutional examination reveals how and why crisis was unavoidable revealing 
that the swollen economic bubble that was created from within. Sakong Il, former 1987-
1988 Minister of Finance, stated the four reasons why foreign investors lacked faith in 
South Korea. First, inexperienced commercial banks overextended credit to the chaebol 
who invested the money towards even more borrowing. Second, businesses strategy 
focused on diversifying market shares rather than specialization and globalization. Third, 
the government’s economic staff was incapacitated because Kim Young Sam replaced 
the deputy prime minister, the chief economic planner, seven times and the senior 
economic secretary to the president six times in five years. Finally, the currency crisis in 
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Southeast Asia was of concern to foreign investors looking at Asia as a whole.149 Fearful 
of foreign domination of the market in the midst of Japan’s new industrial rise, 
stakeholders of South Korea’s economy were mostly native. At the time, South Korea’s 
insulated economic tactics in 1996 disclose that FDI of the external market and foreign 
companies only accounted for “1 percent of total domestic fixed capital formation.”150 
Ultimately, faulty decisions and corporate greed created a false and dangerous sense of 
invincibility. So disillusioned were the leaders that while IMF officials in November of 
1997 visited Seoul and recommended intervention to bail out the country, the economic 
officials replied, “You’re crazy; our system works.”151 
Although the chaebols remain as the main culprits of moral hazard, the reckless 
behavior did not develop overnight. Reverting back to the early industrial stages, 
interventionist policies resulted in targeted resource allocation to build up the heavy and 
chemical industries (HCIs). Government backed companies precipitated the formation of 
monopolies and structural imbalances between the large, medium, and small enterprises. 
As a result, the overall economy did not mature naturally and in the absence of healthy 
competition, domestic companies habitually exploited fiscal policies. Various companies, 
which were established prior to and during the inflated environment, survived the 
catastrophic crisis; however, many that were founded on feeble structure went bankrupt. 
For example, POSCO, a successful steel company thrived even in the 1997 financial 
crisis, attests to its sound infrastructure that were developed during the Park era; 
meanwhile, a product of the 1990s industrial setting, Hanbo steel company’s bankruptcy 
provides a commonplace tale of the end to businesses that were founded on corruption 
and feeble management.152 The 1997 economic crisis serves as a testament to the long-
term consequence of excessive state intervention since Park Chung-hee’s era that  
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thwarted competitive efficiency of the private sector, which created the economic 
environment shaped by moral hazard among the larger firms with the sense that they 
were “too big to fail.”153  
5. Money Politics 
An unofficial practice that allowed chaebols to buy out politicians and weather 
multiple regime transitions was ‘money politics,’ including “both corrupt practices such 
as bribery and legal practices such as campaign finance,” a commonplace political 
institution that enabled the close state business relationship.154  The bargain was simple: 
in return for political favor, businesses financed politicians.  Eliminating the “false-name 
financial system,” in which the country’s elites held accounts under “fictitious names” to 
evade taxes, represented approximately four percent of the country’s domestic deposits 
and a overnight withdrawal of these funds posed two entrenched issues: first, it would 
undermine growth in the small- and medium-sized business sector as the funds were a 
substantial source of finances; second, since the funds involved a vast network of the 
country’s top elites, much personal and professional gains would be lost in the process.155  
This was a cancerous problem earlier obscured under South Korea’s 
unprecedented growth. Although corruption was under control during Park’s era, it was 
not properly regulated throughout the transitions towards democracy.156 In the 1960s, 
since the state retained complete control of the banks and the chaebols were relatively in 
check and small scale corruption did not affect policy. While political contributions 
existed during Park Chung Hee’s presidency, such activities were not to affect central 
policies.157 However, the shift in power from the state to the private sectors had the 
allowed increased extent of influence and furthered the chaebol reign over politicians and 
the economy. As money became the new source for power, careers of the politicians were 
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tied to their network with the conglomerates. President Kim Young Sam utilized the 
government led industrial policies to secure funds for political campaigns. At the origin 
of Kim Young Sam’s tenure, it was evident that the private sector was firmly established 
as a politically backed national institution.  The Korean news agencies Chosun Ilbo and 
Donga Ilbo estimated that over five billion dollars for the presidential and National 
Assembly election expenses including financing the campaigns for Kim Young-Sam 
Kim, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pil in 1992.158 Chaebol political capacity was further 
demonstrated when the Hyundai chairman, Chung Ju Yung, was able upstart his own 
political party winning 24 seats of the South Korean Assembly and taking 16 percent of 
the national popular vote as the presidential candidate all within 1992.159  
The chaebols leveraged personal careers of politicians to directly impact national 
economic goals as well. Accepting the deal to continue leading the economy and 
responding to the initial deconcentration policies, the chaebols, in 1994, influenced the 
Kim Young Sam administration to take a ‘reverse course’ on the deconcentration policy 
and heighten the importance of “big business, export promotion and rapid economic 
growth.”160 By the 1990s, it was obvious that the business oligarchs had replaced the 
military elite as the chaebols effectively ousted the Hanahoe, the secret military society 
comprised of Korean Military Academy (KMA) graduates that once thrived during Park 
and Chun’s era, and became South Korea’s most influential institution.161 Hence, 
policing corruption was a complex task with both business and political leaders at fault. 
And subsequently, the country’s principal nexus of power formed by the ties between the 
government and business sector persists to the present day. 
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C. KIM DAE JUNG (1998–2003) 
1. Post-IMF Reform 
Ironically, post crisis reconstruction required state intervention and the nation’s 
global economic security strategy necessitated the particiaption of the high capacity 
chaebols. At the end of the twentieth century, IMF reform focused on interventions that 
were aimed to rectify the previous generation’s institutions to allow better accountability 
and transparency in order to mitigate future crises. The Kim Dae Jung administration was 
faced with the daunting task of not only rectifying the market economy but also preparing 
an economic environment suitable to meet the challenges of global competition. Despite 
the goal of developing a natural free market to achieve long term stability, it was the 
government that had to restructure the economy once again due to the “lack of 
competition” that caused the inefficiencies and perpetuated the financial moral hazard.162 
First, because the 1997 economic crisis was not salvageable at the domestic level, the 
government was forced to apply to the International Monetary Fund for a $58 billion 
bailout package. Among the reforms mandated by the IMF restructuring in 1998, the 
chaebols and creditor banks agreed upon the “Five Principles of Corporate 
Restructuring” program: “the enhancement of transparency of corporate governance; 
strengthening fiscal accountability allowing voting rights of a broader populace of 
investors; institutionalizing cross-debt guarantees; improvement of financial structure; 
and streamlining business activities.”163 In 1999, Kim Dae-jung added three more 
policies that pressured chaebols to loosen control of “non-banking financial institutions,” 
mitigate “cross subsidiary capital infusion or equity investments and insider trading,” and 
thwart “inheritances and transfers of wealth among family members of chaebol leaders 
who attempt to exploit loopholes.”164 Economic restructuring based on contractual 
obligations allowed containment and regulation of the chaebols. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
162 Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development, 13. 
163 Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development, 227–228; Yong-Chool Ha and Wang 
Hwi Lee, “The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea: Crony Capitalism after Ten Years,” Asian 
Survey 47, no. 6 (2007): 904 
164 Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development, 229. 
 56
constituting a mature free market system without the already monopolized conglomerates 
that have been established as a national financial edifice was not possible. 
2. Post Crisis Liberalization 
South Korea’s economy has rapidly rebounded from 1997 with a state-business 
equilibrium restored to the market. From 1998 to 2008, both Presidents Kim Dae Jung 
and Roh Moo Hyun aimed to transition out of supporting industries and creating a 
balanced market environment.165 While trade GDP ratios have once again increased 
signifying the economy’s steady normalization and integration into the international 
markets, the chaebols continue to exert a degree of independent autonomy. While overall 
debt ratio has been decreasing as the “Big Deals” have been implemented, monopolies in 
“semiconductors, petrochemicals, aerospace, rolling stock, power plant equipment, vessel 
engines, and oil refining” continue to exist.166 Utilizing neoclassical growth factors to the 
gauge the business environment, South Korea’s concentration of human capital, physical 
capital, and TFP remain with the chaebols who have diversified their network to include 
social media, political support, national sports, research and development, agriculture, 
electronics, education, tourism, etc. Through organizational innovation and adaptability 
that has enmeshed the companies with the country’s societal growth, chaebols continue 
to thrive as a powerful institution today.  
Truncating the number of chaebols was merely the state’s short term agenda to 
stabilize the market. The resolution to handle the bankrupt companies, including Hanbo, 
Kia, and Daewoo, after the crisis called for corporate finance restructuring plan was 
based on the “London Approach.” In South Korea’s case, each creditor bank set up a 
Decision Committee for Insolvent Enterprises (DCIE) in May 1998 and the Financial 
Supervisory Commission announced a corporate “blacklist” naming 55 firms (including 
20 affiliates of the top five chaebols and 32 affiliates of the top six to 64 chaebols) that 
were classified as insolvent and non-viable.167 The state’s “Big Deal,” agreed by the 
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“Federation of Korean Industries (the chaebol umbrella organization), creditor banks, and 
the government,” forced the chaebols to reduce surplus capacity with business swaps; 
and as a result, on September 3, 1998, Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and SK 
restructured their companies with inter-organizational transfer of businesses while re-
establishing respective core specialties.168 By 1999, the chaebols, “while reduced in 
number but increased in size”, were once again leading the nation’s economic rapid 
recovery and by accumulating foreign currency reserves through their exports, the 
chaebol were re-established as the ‘savior of the economy.’169 Furthermore, the decision 
to dismantle the chaebols became too costly in a political sense. With the upcoming 2000 
general election, President Kim Dae Jung nullified the decision to shutdown Samsung 
Motor’s factory in the city of Pusan because President Kim Young Sam and the GNP 
held significant political influence in South Korea’s southwest region.170 Reducing the 
autonomy and capacity of the chaebols required a durable and continuing strategy that 
proved difficult to implement. 
The long term solution to balancing the chaebols by increasing foreign investment 
in the private sector was also limited.171 Initially, individual foreigners were limited to 
owning no more than seven percent of the shares of any Korean company and “collective 
foreign share portion” was limited to 26 percent.172 But by December 3, 1997, the 
Korean government raised both limits to 50 percent and in May of 1998, foreign 
shareholding ceilings were eliminated and “hostile takeovers” of companies were allowed 
as well.173 As a result, Daewoo Motors, Samsung Motors, and Ssangyong Motors were 
acquired by multinational companies (MNCs) and foreign shareholdings in the South 
Korean stock market went beyond 40 percent in 2004.174 Friction points to the reform 
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arose when public sentiment against the foreign economic involvement was fueled by the 
chaebols and Grand National Party (GNP). The chaebols were able to enhance their 
image as antagonism against the IMF worsened the public’s “xenophobic sentiments.”175 
Moreover, former chairman of Dae-woo, Kim Woo Choong, claimed that the IMF along 
with foreign investors “impos[ing] Anglo-American corporate governance to undermine 
national competitiveness” resulting in mobilizing national sentiment and thwarting 
General Motors’ (GM) plan to acquire Daewoo Motors from employers and trade 
unions.176 It was naïve to believe that increasing foreign investors in the national 
economy would weaken the deeply rooted chaebol.177 Now, in addition to the state and 
the chaebols, foreign investors were added as a major stake holder in the economy.178 
Although foreign investors linked South Korea to the global economy, this did not 
significantly change the country’s corporate structures. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The magnitude of how the 1997 crisis affected South Korea attests to the 
consequences of permitting monopolies to prevail in a capitalist economy. While 
President Kim Young-sam faced the option to police the chaebols or allow market 
liberalization allowing international market forces to stabilize the economy, indecision 
further stimulated corporate monopolization and global ventures, which made the 
national economy more vulnerable to the international market.  Eventually, dismissing 
institutional errors, relying on the chaebols to achieve a successful transition throughout 
South Korea’s segyehwa or globalization campaign proved disastrous. South Korean 
government’s implicit under-writing of chaebol debt and business practices merely 
exacerbated the 1997 IMF crisis. Specifically, the chaebols’ moral hazard as the nation 
became more reliant on foreign capital worsened the impact of the financial calamity in 
South Korea. The extent of the chaebols’ involvement and organizational resilience as 
they weathered a national market shock provide profound lessons. Over time, the 
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presidential transitions and the reactionary policies intended to foster a liberal market 
economy facilitated the shifting state-business balance in favor of the chaebols. The 
unrestricted legacy of the family owned businesses persists but this was a political 
symptom that was perpetuated before the 1997 crisis reform as market stabilization 
constantly depended on the chaebols since industrialization. In the end, even post-crisis 
reform was too little too late as the state had concentrated and staked the nation’s 
economic security into the fate of the chaebols. Ultimately, the South Korean state did 
not comprehensively adapt to financial liberalization, which required a dynamic solution 
integrating the state, foreign market, and the chaebols to coexist instead of the “simple 
free-market paradigm” that simply aimed to minimizing and maximizing state 
intervention.179 The state cannot expect mass capital alone to naturally empower the state 
and foster a robust market and as capital become a cornerstone in all facets of society, the 
chaebols have developed into a diverse entity.180 In South Korea’s advanced capitalist 
society, political, economic, and social institutions continue to impact one another.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The tale of South Korea’s industrialization serves as a significant case study to the 
discipline of political economy. The challenge of managing national wealth through the 
advent of capitalism has spawned a contentious debate between liberal and institutional 
theorists. On one hand, the concept of allowing a free market economy to develop on its 
own with a minimal government role seemed ideal. Strictly in terms of economics, the 
process of growth necessitates the accumulation of physical capital, advances in human 
capital, and continual application of total factor productivity. Key elements towards the 
advances towards an efficient economy such as the division of labor, progressive 
competition, and trade were to be developed by the “invisible hand” of a self-correcting 
market system.  To the market-liberals any state intervention aside from necessary 
regulatory institutions would distort the competitive process and the overall market 
system. Yet liberal theories do not address the array of political, economic, and social 
factors that collectively form the market economy. Not all societies are equipped with the 
infrastructural foundations for free market economic operations and those with existential 
security threats are also faced with a constrained timeline. Institutionalism reveals that 
institutions interact, evolve, and constantly affect one another—and the role of each 
institution varies among societies. The institutionalist perspective reveals that evolution 
of market institutions were predicated on multiple factors, including timing, conditions, 
and interests. 
This thesis has examined a series of transitional vulnerabilities in order to 
diagnose where the South Korea’s mercantilist policies failed to sustain the country’s 
evolution towards a free market economy. The comparative analysis of the state-business 
balance throughout the growth periods illustrates when, how, and why the chaebols 
became the main vehicle for achieving South Korean economic growth. Post war 
industrialization and the advent of capitalism in South Korea enabled a unique and 
illiberal economy to develop. To begin, the primary institution utilized to gauge national 
development of the South Korean plan rational economy was the state-business 
relationship. The chaebols capitalized on the institutional changes during each of the 
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Republics: the 3rd and 4th Republics under Park Chung-hee marked the initiation of the 
state-chaebol partnership; monopolization of the market began during Chun Doo-hwan’s 
authoritarian transition; and the inauguration of South Korea’s liberal democracy allowed 
the chaebols to establish themselves as a durable institution. A focus on these transitional 
periods discloses both intentional and inadvertent allowance of corporate monopolization, 
as the chaebols operated under a volatile political and economic environment marked by 
narrow and myopic leadership prerogatives and policies. Furthermore, the growing 
dominance of the chaebol created a series of negative effects in terms of economic 
outcomes such as growth, corruption, and market distortions. In the end, the advantages 
of the two different political systems experienced by South Korea—top down 
authoritarian decisiveness as well as democratic transparency and accountability – were 
not capitalized upon and Korea’s political leaders failed to prevent the chaebols from 
becoming the country’s oligarchy. Of concern, South Korea’s national growth has been 
declining and has currently reached a plateau (see Figure 2).181  
 
Figure 2.  Korea's Long-Term Growth Trend 
                                                 
181 Changmock Shin, “Causes of the Decline in Korea’s Long-Term Growth Trend: Expenditures,” 
Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2012.  
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Exploring the various organizational and operational practices of the chaebols can 
provide insight to potential innovation or TFP factors, which in turn can indicate and 
project links to economic stagnation or advances. Research on how the chaebols have 
better adapted to the advanced democratic environment and the impacts they have had on 
the weak financial system illustrates how Korea’s policies have been outpaced by modern 
economic conditions. The chaebols continue to exist today as the main proprietors of the 
country’s wealth directly linking chaebol organizational capacity to national economic 
capacity. Sales of the top 10 chaebols in 2011 accounted for approximately 80 percent of 
South Korea’s GDP responsible for 83.1 billion dollars out of country’s 1.1 trillion dollar 
aggregate production.182 Comparing dominant economic institutions can also provide 
lessons learned for how to maneuver the state-business relationship. The evolution of 
“Japan, Inc.” reveals similarities and differences to the chaebols that would better explain 
the future and various circumstances of the state-business interface across countries.  The 
recent dawn of the American financial crisis that began in 2007 also reveal similar 
organizational structures, moral hazard with speculative investments, corruption, and 
feeble regulatory institutions that were exploited by financial oligarchs—portraying again 
a similar situation where the national state-business imbalance in the market remains 
unresolved.  
The gravity of the role played by societal forces, especially the state, along with 
economic players in the market is imperative to grasp during periods of liberalization and 
crises. Since growth strategies are inherently esoteric to any nation, limiting the 
description and prescription of capitalist trajectories to one mindset would be myopic and 
precarious as ideas, interests, and institutions differ among countries. Economic 
sociology and the history of industrialization teach that each country’s balance between 
the state and market is unique. Stakeholders that are able to influence economic policies 
must understand that “capitalism’s durability lies in its almost infinite malleability” and 
the onus is upon moral decisions that can achieve sustainable efficiency and efficacy.183  
                                                 
182 Kwon, Eun-jung. “Top Ten Chaebol Now Almost 80% of Korean Economy,” Hankyoreh, August, 
28, 2012. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/549028.html 
183 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 233. 
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